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AUTONOMY THESES REVISITED 
Robert N. Van Wyk 
A recurring topic in moral philosophy and the philosophy of religion is the 
so-called autonomy thesis. I wish to make a distinction between what I will call 
a weak autonomy thesis and what I will call a strong autonomy thesis. The 
former maintains that basic moral convictions are in some sense prior to basic 
religious convictions, so that if it is possible to justify any set of moral convictions 
at all, it is possible to justify some such set without reference to God. A strong 
autonomy thesis would go further by not only maintaining that reference to the 
nature or will of God is not necessary for arriving at some set of moral convictions, 
but also that such reference to the will or nature of God is totally irrelevant to 
any set of moral convictions, that is, that any conclusions reached with the aid 
of such references could have been reached without them or are else unjustified. 
I wish to take issue with the strong autonomy thesis and to say something about 
the relationship between an ethic that a person might consider to be justified or 
vindicated on nontheological grounds and one he or she might consider to be 
justified on theological grounds. 
One attempt to justify a theologically based ethics is by means of defining 
"right" or "good" totally in terms of some reference to the will or nature of God. 
Definitions of "God," can be divided into two basic types, but both of these 
types present problems for defining "right" or "good" in terms of conformity to 
God's will or nature. There are those approaches which include moral or evalua-
tive criteria, such as when "God" is defined as "that being which is worthy of 
worship," and there are those which do not include evaluative criteria, such as 
when "God" is defined as "The Creator," "The Necessary Being," or "The 
Eternal Being." If the first sort of approach is taken, then not all moral concepts 
can be defined by means of some reference to God, although there is the possibility 
that "right" could be defined in such a way while "good" was not so defined. 
Suppose, however, that the second sort of approach is taken. Presumably a 
person who seeks to maintain that "good" or "right" is equivalent by definition 
to conformity to the will or nature of God does so to deal with such a question 
as "Why is it right to obey God?" But if the second sort of approach is taken 
any such question can be reintroduced as a question about why this definition 
of "good" or "right" should be adopted. 
A second attempt to justify a theologically based ethic is by means of reference 
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to the power of God. It would be foolish to resist absolute power. This is a 
position taken by P. T. Geach l and perhaps by the theologian Emil Brunner,2 
though his position is somewhat ambiguous. This approach has been criticized 
widely on moral grounds by atheistic philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen,3 by 
Theistic philosophers, such as A. C. Ewing,' and also by such theologians as 
Karl Barth. Barth writes: 
Of itself this (God's power) does not provide us with the basis of the 
divine claim and the basis of human obedience to this claim .... Man 
as man is still free in face of power as power. He can sink under it; he 
can be annihilated by it. But he does not owe it obedience, and even 
the most preponderant power cannot as such compel him to obey. Power 
as power does not have any divine claim, no matter how imposing or 
effective it might be. To maintain himself against power as power, even 
to his undoing, is not merely a possibility for man. it is not merely the 
assertion of his right and dignity. It is the duty he has to fulfil with his 
existence as man. 5 
Perhaps in discussing the types of justifications for acting on the basis of a 
theological ethic we ought to begin with those that are found in the religious 
texts. In fact a common reason given in the Bible for acting in a particular way 
is that God himself acts in that way, or that acting in such a way expresses a 
kind of disposition that is intrinsic to God's nature. According to Matthew 
5:43-48, Jesus taught that the goal of human life is for one to become a son or 
child of God, which in fact means reflecting God's nature and purpose. God's 
nature is reflected in his purpose, which, according to this passage, is to have 
compassion and mercy indiscriminately on all people. A child of God, then, is 
one who has such mercy and love, even for the enemy. Similar views are 
frequently expressed elsewhere in the New Testament as well. 
Be kind to one another, tenderhearted, forgiving one another, as God 
in Christ forgave you. (Ephesians 4:32) 
And walk in love, as Christ loved us. (Ephesians 5:32) 
As the Lord has forgiven you, so you must forgive. (Colossians 3: 13) 
Beloved, if God so loved us, we also ought to love one another. (I John 
4:13) 
Why should we accept God's commands as binding on us? One objection we 
raise to other people's expectations concerning us and demands on us is that 
they expect us to live up to standards or fulfil expectations that they themselves 
do not live up to or fulfil. These Biblical passages claim that God conforms to 
the standards he imposes on others. 
Of course we might have every right to object to someone's imposing demands 
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on us, even if that person himself lived according to the standards reflected in 
these demands. These demands may reflect misguided principles. So it would 
seem that we only have a good reason to obey God if God's nature as expressed 
in his own actions and in his demands on human beings is good. Theologians 
have agreed with this. Karl Barth writes: 
The goodness of human action consists in the goodness with which God 
acts toward man. But God deals with man through His Word. Therefore 
man does good in so far as he hears the Word of God and acts as a 
hearer of this Word. In this action as a hearer he is obedient. Why is 
obedience good? ... It is good because the divine address is good, 
because God Himself is good. 6 
But does this not in fact acknowledge the truth of the autonomy thesis, for how 
can we come to the conclusion that God in his nature and activity is good, except 
by our own judgment? In fact, however, accepting what Barth writes here only 
commits one to the weak autonomy thesis, that is, to the possibility oflegitimately 
using moral criteria which make no reference to God. It does not show that 
God's nature, purpose, and will are irrelevant to ethics. They may in fact be 
relevant in various ways. 
While there must be some moral criteria that are logically prior to any judgment 
about the goodness of God, the recognition of the validity of such criteria is not 
necessarily temporally prior to the judgment that God is good. So one connection 
between religion and ethics is shown in the following example. While considering 
the harm that people do to each other a person may not see extensive forgiveness 
as something that is morally commendable, but in coming to see himself or 
herself as both deeply in need of forgiveness and as being forgiven by God 
through Christ, that person may, possibly in the very process of becoming a 
Christian, recognize in the same instant the goodness of God and the goodness 
of forgiveness. Although such a person can only judge God to be good according 
to a set of criteria that includes the criterion that unmerited forgiveness is good, 
and so in a sense "forgiveness is good" is an autonomous judgment logically 
prior to the judgment, "God is good," it is also true that it is only because beliefs 
about God and about himself or herself have forced that person to look at 
forgiveness from a different angle that either of these judgments are arrived at, 
and therefore also that God's demand that one be forgiving is recognized as 
good and as binding on one's behavior. 
A proponent of the autonomy thesis might respond in the following manner. 
It may indeed be true that religious experience or religious faith may change a 
person's perspective on moral issues, but so might many other things, e.g., 
being helped by a member of an enemy group or a group against which one had 
been prejudiced, getting sick, falling in love, watching someone die, living 
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among the poor, etc. Conceivably one could come to look at love or forgiveness 
in the way that the New Testament does without having any belief in God. It 
can still be claimed, therefore, that while beliefs about God may not be psycholog-
ically irrelevant to ethics, they are logically irrelevant. I wish to refute such a 
claim. 
In attempting to refute the strong autonomy thesis the task to be accomplished 
should not be made to appear more formidable than necessary. The discussion 
of the pros and cons of the autonomy thesis has often been led astray by concen-
trating on atypical examples, such as the story in Genesis in which God purpor-
tedly commands Abraham to offer his son, Isaac, as a sacrifice. So we are faced 
with a case in which God is portrayed as commanding something which just 
about everyone would regard as morally forbidden, whatever their moral theories 
might be. God says it is obligatory to do X. Our own moral sentiments and 
moral judgments lead us to say that it is obligatory to refrain from doing X. But 
in fact this is not a typical case. If we take the teachings of the Sermon on the 
Mount for our example, or those found in numerous other passages in the New 
Testament, what God is portrayed as commanding is not something which would 
probably be judged to be morally forbidden, either by criteria that people of that 
time might use, or by criteria that we ourselves might use. Rather what God is 
portrayed as commanding is generally something which at worst would be 
regarded as morally neutral and at best would be regarded as morally admirable, 
but not morally required. So the relationship between an ethic of a particular 
religious cominunity and the ethics of morally sensitive people in the society 
generally is not usually one in which what is forbidden in the latter is required 
in the former, but one, for the most part, in which what is not required in the 
latter, but perhaps admired, is in fact regarded as obligatory in the former (e.g., 
loving not only friends, but enemies as well, not only abiding by the minimal 
requirements of justice, but also sacrificing for the benefit of the poor, etc.)" In 
those cases where what God is believed to command is incompatible with what 
independent moral considerations would seem to require, the believer is not 
likely to say that God's command overrides other moral considerations, but 
rather that the independent criteria being used are either mistaken or misapplied. 
The task of one who sets out to refute the autonomy thesis is thus not necessarily 
the formidable task of somehow showing how reference to the will or nature of 
God can make moral judgments appear where otherwise they would be totally 
unknown, and it is definitely not the even more formidable task of making what 
would otherwise seem evil into a moral obligation. 8 
It would seem, then, that a necessary condition for God's commands being 
binding on us is that they express purposes which meet independent criteria of 
goodness. Suppose that they in fact do that. This would not be sufficient to 
generate a duty of obedience to those commands. The purposes of CROP, the 
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Red Cross, etc. very likely meet such criteria of goodness, and, while there may 
be an imperfect duty to be charitable there is no perfect duty to support any 
particular one of these groups, or to obey their commands if they were to issue 
any. For the commands of God to be binding on us some other condition or 
conditions must be met which would distinguish God's commands from others 
issued in pursuit of desirable goals. One reason for regarding God's commands 
as authoritative in a way that others are not is that God's purposes are understood 
to be all-encompassing and based on total awareness of all considerations, while 
others are not. In addition, it can be argued, as R. G. Swinburne9 and Baruch 
BrodylO have both argued, that the commands of God impose obligations on us 
because God is the Creator who has property rights both over the world in 
general, of which we make use, and over ourselves as part of the world. We 
are not owners of the world, and that of which we are not owners includes our 
wealth, abilities, etc., but rather we are stewards, who, in Brody's words, "have 
an obligation to follow the wishes of him from whom we got our stewardship."11 
Brody seems to be arguing that God's having property rights over us, and over 
that of which we make use, would be a sufficient condition for our having an 
obligation of obedience to God. This does not seem to me to be true. The fact 
that someone else owns something that is temporarily in my possession does not 
put me under an obligation to use that possession for anything for which he 
might want me to use it, even if it is something evil, or even to make it available 
for use by the owner if the intended use is evil. In other words, obligations of 
stewardship could be overridden by other duties. R. G. Swinburne makes the 
same point, asserting that "there are surely limits to the obligations which a 
divine command could create. Exactly where they are to be set men will differ. "12 
If the owner of that of which we have temporary possession, including ourselves, 
requires us, however, to mal<e what we have available for some good purpose 
(or perhaps even for a morally neutral one), and if the owner cannot be challenged 
as to his understanding of the total situation, then the issue of an obligation of 
stewardship being overridden by another duty does not arise. So the fact that 
we are in this particular relationship to the owner of all we have, including 
ourselves, would seem to put us in the position of being under an obligation to 
do some things which, although perhaps admirable, would not otherwise be 
required. Thus the combination of beliefs about God's goodness, God's knowl-
edge, and God's being our Creator, would seem to be sufficient to impose on 
us duties we would not otherwise have reason to acknowledge. 13 This seems to 
me to refute the claim that an advocate of a strong autonomy thesis might be 
making (another claim an advocate of a strong autonomy thesis might be making 
will be considered in the final section of this paper.) It does not, however, 
contradict the weak autonomy thesis, since it would seem that for God's will to 
be binding on us there must be independent criteria of goodness that it does not 
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violate. 
A person who approaches these matters primarily with theological rather than 
philosophical concerns might be uneasy with the approach here outlined because 
it may seem to make humanity's duty of obedience to God contingent on a 
human judgment that God does or does not meet certain criteria of goodness. I 
do not, however, believe that this position has that difficulty. We can look again 
at the illustration of a person who, because of religious experience, or because 
of newly acquired religious beliefs, comes to believe at the same time both in 
the goodness of forgiveness and in the goodness of the God who grants and 
demands forgiveness. In a sense God's command met logically independent 
(though not necessarily psychologically independent) criteria of goodness. If the 
person had never achieved this change of outlook, however, this would not have 
somehow made it to be true that God's command was not good. Similarly, the 
failure of a whole society, or of the whole human race, to see that certain criteria 
are the appropriate ones and that God's command meets those criteria would not 
mean that in fact it did not meet the appropriate criteria. Perhaps there are factors, 
which Christianity calls sin, such as pride, selfishness, self-righteousness, pre-
judice, etc., which hinder human beings from seeing certain things properly, 
such as when they fail to appreciate the goodness of forgiveness or compassion. 
In addition, an individual human being making a judgment in specific historical 
circumstances is ignorant of much of the larger context of the situation which 
may be relevant to deciding what is morally required. 14 So to say that a necessary 
condition for God's command being binding on us is its being issued by a Being 
who has certain characteristics that meet independent criteria of goodness, perhaps 
as part of an overall purpose that meets independent criteria of goodness, is not 
to say that God's goodness is dependent on the judgment of any particular person 
or society. It mayor may not be true that when a person says that something is 
morally good or morally right he or she is appealing to some kind of ultimate 
consensus of those who seek to be rational, impartial, consistent, and fully 
informed concerning the relevant facts, as Frankena says; but if it is true, the 
consensus being appealed to is not an actual consensus, but is, as Frankena also 
says, a hypothetical consensus "that never comes or comes only on the Day of 
Judgment."ls The judgment that any particular individual or society makes may 
be far different from what would be made under the specified conditions. So 
the duty of obedience to commands which reflect God's purposes is not contingent 
on the judgments of any particular human beings in the actual world. 
The view that in order to generate a duty of obedience the will of God must 
meet some independent criteria of goodness does not require that we accept the 
position that these criteria are the ones which would be acknowledged by human 
beings looking at the matter from some ideal perspective, but it is quite compatible 
with that position, and that position seems plausible. The person who approaches 
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the matter primarily with theological concerns might still fell uneasy with this 
position, however, objecting that such a position would still seem to make 
humanity in some sense the judge of God. I do not, however, believe that this 
unease is necessary. What criteria would human beings in a position where they 
were no longer influenced by partiality, prejudice, ignorance, pride, etc., that 
is, where they are no longer influenced either by sin or by the effects of finitude, 
use in judging whether God, as reflected in his purposes and commands, is 
good? The believer's answer should be, it would seem, those criteria which 
fundamental human nature, freed from the above mentioned distortions, and 
other similar ones, would lead human beings to use. But where does that human 
nature come from? It was, according to the believer, created by God in God's 
own image in the light of and for the sake of God's own purposes. God and 
God's purposes are thus still ontologically prior to everything else. What human 
beings would judge to be good in such an ideal situation, therefore, would be 
determined by the nature of man created in God's image, which in tum is 
determined by God's purposes, and thus ultimately by God's own nature. 
We have been dealing with what the autonomy thesis would seem to be 
claiming, and with what in fact seems to be true, about the relationship between 
correct moral criteria and the ability of the actual commands of an actual God 
to create moral obligations binding on human beings. Human beings, however, 
have to make moral judgments from where they are now, and not from some 
position of ideal knowledge. Where they are now is a position where criteria of 
goodness are not uncontroversial, and where the content of God's commands, 
even among adherents of the same faith, such as Christianity, is a matter of 
disagreement and uncertainty. What happens when a person who believes that 
God is good and that there is an obligation to obey God comes across purported 
commands of God which seem to run counter to that person's previously held 
or newly acquired beliefs about what is morally good? Suppose that person seeks 
to reevaluate those moral beliefs in the light of moral intuitions or the apparent 
implications of moral principles. Suppose the intuitions, or the principles and 
the attempt to see their implications, have been carefully examined and compen-
sated for when there was any reason to believe that they were influenced by 
prejudice, vested interest, lack of sensitivity, etc. What happens when those 
beliefs continue to conflict with the purported command of God? A person facing 
this situation can modify his or her beliefs by ceasing to believe that God exists, 
or by ceasing to believe that God is good, or by coming to believe that the being 
who issues these commands is not worthy to be called, "God," whatever 
metaphysical attributes that being might possess, or by concluding that certain 
moral beliefs or processes of reasoning about morality must be revised, or by 
concluding that generally reliable moral principles, intuitions, criteria, or pro-
cesses of reasoning may not be reliable in every particular case. Probably the 
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alternative that is most often taken, however, is that of simply concluding that 
God was not really the source of the troublesome command. Choosing this 
alternative will often require other changes in a person's system of beliefs, 
especially with respect to how the will of God is to be known. Many Catholics, 
finding the teaching of the hierarchy on contraception to be troublesome, have 
chosen to modify their beliefs about the ways in which the teaching of the 
Catholic Church is to be regarded as authoritatively expressing the will of God, 
rather than choosing any of the other alternatives. Similarly, many Christians of 
various traditions have chosen to reject certain theories of Biblical inspiration 
when those theories seemed to require them to believe that God really did 
command the Israelites indiscriminately to slaughter the Canaanites, or Abraham 
to sacrifice Isaac. This option, however, becomes less attractive as the beliefs 
in question get nearer to the heart of a particular faith. One can reject many 
things most Christians have traditionally believed and still plausibly call oneself 
a Christian, but to reject the New Testament's view on love and forgiveness is 
to reject the Christian understanding of God, and so to reject Christianity. 
In the previous paragraph a person's moral and religious beliefs were looked 
at as part of the sort of web of beliefs of which Quine writes. 16 Looking at the 
matter from this point of view, it would seem that what the strong autonomy 
thesis would be claiming is that while it is permissible for a person to reject or 
modify previously held moral beliefs, perhaps radically, for the sake of reestab-
lishing consistency within his or her system of beliefs, it is never permissible 
to do so if some of the beliefs which produce the inconsistency are theological 
or religious beliefs and there is the option of rejecting or modifying these beliefs 
instead. But this is to say that with respect to such a web of beliefs it can be 
legislated in advance where modifications mayor may not be made when recal-
citrant data are encountered or when inc~nsistencies arise. Perhaps this is true 
for something like the law of noncontradiction, but I cannot think of any reason 
to regard it as true with respect to the sorts of moral and religious beliefs under 
consideration here. Can it really be said that a person who has been employing 
moral criteria that do not lead him to accept absolute nonviolence, but who then 
comes to believe that in fact God does command absolute nonviolence, must 
necessarily be making a wrong choice if he believes he has a moral obligation 
to abide by what he takes to be the will of God. From this point of view the 
strong autonomy thesis seems to me to be obviously false, perhaps almost absurd. 
At the same time four considerations seem to me to support a weak autonomy 
thesis: (1) People without theological beliefs obviously have moral beliefs and 
use moral language; (2) people with theological beliefs and those without theolog-
ical beliefs frequently discuss moral issues fruitfully so that there must be some 
overlap in the criteria that they use for the application of various moral terms; 
(3) people with theological beliefs do modify those beliefs because of inconsis-
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tencies brought about by the application of such criteria; and (4) I cannot think 
of any reason to regard them as doing anything irrational, immoral, impious, or 
improper when they do so. If we think of our individual beliefs as belonging to 
the sort of web of beliefs that Quine describes, which I believe is the correct 
way of looking at them, then both rejecting a weak autonomy thesis and accepting 
a strong autonomy thesis are ways of attempting to legislate in advance where 
modifications may not be made when inconsistencies arise. I cannot think of 
any reason for legislating such prohibitions, or accepting them. 
University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown 
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